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CASE NOTES
Legal Ethics—The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility—
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(8)—Former Government Attorneys and
the Appearance of Evil Doctrine—General Motors Corp. v. City of
New York. ' —On October 4, 1972, the City of New York instituted
a class action against General Motors, alleging that General Motors
had, inter alia, 2 violated section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 3 by
attempting to monopolize and monopolizing "trade and commerce in
the manufacture and sale of city buses."
Prior to filing suit, the City's Office of Corporation Counsel
retained Mr. George Reycraft, a partner in a private New York law
firm, primarily to assist in preparing the complaint, on a contingent
fee basis. In 1954, Reycraft had been employed by the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice as a trial attor-
ney in the General Litigation Section. He was subsequently assigned
to an investigation of the alleged .monopolization of the city and
intercity bus business by General Motors, which culminated in the
issuance of a complaint, in 1956, alleging a violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act. 5 Though never in charge of 1956 Bus, Reycraft
admitted that he had participated substantially in the preparatory
proceedings, and had, in fact, signed the complaint. 6 He continued
such active involvement in the capacity of staff attorney until 1956
when, via an appointment to the Special Trial Section of the Anti-
trust Division, he "no longer had any direct or indirect involvement
with the 1956 Bus case." 7
In 1961, Reycraft was promoted to Chief of Section Operations,
and assumed technical responsibility for 1956 Bus, although he
could recall no active participation in the matter from the date of his
appointment to the Special Trial Section until his departure from
the Antitrust Division in December, 1962.B
' 501 F,2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
2 Another cause of action alleged that General Motors (G.M.) had violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), by acquiring a controlling interest in Yellow Truck &
Coach Mfg. Co., which acquisition " 'threatens substantially to lessen competition and [tends]
to create a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of buses within the United States . . . "
501 F.2d at 641, quoting the complaint filed by the City of New York.
3
 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
501 F.2d at 641, quoting the complaint filed by the City of New York.
The Second Circuit also determined that, under the test of Kohn v. Royall, Koegel and
Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098 (2d Cir. 1974), G.M. could not appeal the federal district court's
interlocutory order granting class action standing to the City at this preliminary stage of the
proceeding. 501 F.2d at 664. Judge Mansfield concurred in the result despite his disagreement
with certain of the criteria used by the majority in reaching the conclusion of non-
appealability. Id. at 656.
United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 15816 (E.G. Mich. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as 1956 Bus], The case eventually ended in a settlement.
6 501 F.2d at 642, quoting Affidavit of George D. Reycraft, sworn to on June 18, 1973 at
11 3 [hereinafter cited as Affidavit].
7
 501 F.2d at 642, quoting Affidavit, supra note 6, at ¶ 4.
g 501 F.2d at 642. A grand jury inquired into the operations of General Motors'
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In the light of Reycraft's participation in 1956 Bus, General
Motors moved for his disqualification from the instant case, on the
theory that his involvement therein violated Canon 9 9 of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (present
Canon 9) and subjoined Disciplinary Rule DR 9-101(B).' 0 In refus-
ing to disqualify Reycraft, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York reasoned first, that his role as
counsel for the City in General Motors was not "private employ-
ment" within the meaning of DR 9-101(B), and second, that General
Motors was not the same "matter" with which Reycraft was in-
volved during his employment with the Justice Department."
In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that present
Canon 9 is intended to prevent the employment of former public
employees by private -parties in matters directly opposed to the
employee's formerly adopted public position, and that, in the instant
case, the interests of the City and the federal government coin-
cided. 12
 The court concluded that the facts necessary to support the
Electromotive Division from 1959 to 196!, and Reycraft was substantially involved in that
investigation. The ethical issue raised by this fact was aired in the district court, but the court
of appeals did not reach it, since Reycraft's participation in 1956 Bus was declared sufficient
to warrant his disqualification. Id. at n.6.
9
 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as ABA Code], Canon 9,
provides: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety."
The preliminary statement to the ABA Code states:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the
general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are
derived.
ABA Code, Preliminary Statement.
1 ° ABA Code, DR 9-101(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a
matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
The preliminary statement to the Code states:
The Disciplinary Rules . . . are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules
state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary
Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their
professional activities.
ABA Code, Preliminary Statement.
Although the issue was not raised in the instant case, it is interesting to note that courts
possess inherent power to enforce ethical rules.
Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated his moral and
ethical responsibility, an important question of professional ethics is raised. It is the
duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it is that court which is
authorized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar. The courts, as well as
the bar, have a responsibility to maintain public confidence in the legal profession.
This means that a court may disqualify an attorney for not only acting improperly
but also for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
Richardson v. Hamlin Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 986 (1973). See also Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); E.F.
Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
h City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12
 Id. at 401.
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present antitrust claim were not sufficiently similar to the facts
alleged in 1956 Bus to constitute the same matter under DR
9-101(B)." The addition of a Clayton Act claim, 14 a four-year
statute of limitations" running from the date of accrual of the cause
of action, and testimony indicating that a preponderance of proof
necessarily would consist of events occurring within the past de-
cade,I 6
 differentiated the cases under DR 9-101(B) in the district
court's view, since the 1956 Bus complaint was filed sixteen years
prior to the General Motors complaint, and since Reycraft's depar-
ture from the Justice Department predated the filing of the General
Motors complaint by ten years.' 7
In reversing the decision below, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit HELD: Where an attorney who had
substantial responsibility for the initiation of a suit as a government
employee, accepts subsequent employment from another gov-
ernmental unit in a case alleging a sufficient number of similar facts
as had been alleged in the former suit to constitute the same matter
under DR 9-101(B) and whose compensatory arrangement with the
subsequent employer is such that he stands to profit to a degree
which qualifies as private employment under DR 9-101(B), his dis-
qualification from the subsequent suit is required to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety.'&
The Second Circuit's conclusion that 1956 Bus and General
Motors involved the same matter for purposes of DR 9-101(B) was
founded, in part, on a comparison of the complaints issued in each
case.' 9
 Much of the language and the entire substance of almost
every allegation of monopoly contained in the 1956 Bus complaint
was repeated in the General Motors complaint. 20 The lapse of time
between the 1956 Bus and General Motors actions was not, in the
court's view, controlling, particularly where a history of G.M.'s
operations might prove to be a significant component in the estab-
lishment of a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 21
 Rather, it
was emphasized that the existence of slight variations in arcane
matters of proof was an inadequate basis for continued participation
by Reycraft, in view of the "nuclear identity" of the suits and the
13 Id. at 402.
14 See note 2 supra.
is 15 U.S.C.	 15b (1970).
16 60 F.R.D. at 402, quoting Affidavit, supra note 6, at ¶ 14,
17 60 F.R.D. at 402.
14 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 60
F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14 501 F.2d at 650.
24 See id. at 652-55 (Appendix).
31
 But an equally essential element in proving a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act is either an intent to monopolize or an abuse of monopoly power.
Moreover, to decide the question whether CM is a passive recipient of monopoly
power, a history of its operations will be imperative.
501 F.2d at 650.
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crucial importance of appearances in the ethical realm. 22 The court
of appeals further reasoned that Reycraft's involvement in General
Motors typified the category of employment referred to as "private"
under DR 9-101(B) because the improper appearance to which that
word refers is embodied, under these facts, in the contingent fee. 23
This note will begin with a consideration of former Canon 36 24
of the Canons of Professional Ethics (former Canon 36), the pro-
genitor of DR 9-101(B). The judicial interpretations of that Canon
will be examined, in an attempt to develop a proper understanding
of the effect of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, spe-
cifically, of present Canons 4 and 9 on current standards of ethical
behavior. An analysis of whether Reycraft's involvement in General
Motors should be construed as private employment within the mean-
ing of DR 9-101(B) will follow. The objective differences and
similarities in the factual settings of General Motors and .1956 Bus
will then be discussed in an effort to determine whether they consti-
tute the same matter as that term is used in DR 9-101(13). Finally,
the impact of General Motors upon the future employment oppor-
tunities of the former government attorney will undergo evaluation.
A comparison between General Motors and prior case law, and an
additional inquiry into the meaning of "substantial responsibility" in
DR 9-101(B) will follow, in an effort to focus more properly on the
extent and limitations of the "appearance of evil" doctrine.
The district court and the Second Circuit adopted widely var-
iant views in construing the proper scope of present Canon 9 and
DR 9-101(B). Present Canon 9 provides: "A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." 25 Disciplinary
Rule 9-101(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not accept private employ-
ment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he
was a public employee. "26
In refusing to find that Reycraft's employment in General
Motors constituted a violation of DR 9-101(B), the district court
emphasized that the consistency of legal positions adopted by Rey-
craft in the two cases could not give rise to the appearance of evil to
which Canon 9 pertains. 27 However, the Second Circuit's reversal,
suggesting a broader construction of DR 9-101(B), apparently is
more consistent with the history of Canon 9, and its relation to other
present Canons.
An indication of the desirability of interpreting Canon 9 and
21 Id. at 651.
21 Id. at 650 n.20. The City's damage claim amounted to $12,000,000. Id. at 641.
24 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 36 thereinafter cited as ABA Canons],
provided, in pertinent part: "A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ."
15 ABA Code, Canon 9.
26
 ABA Code, DR 9-101(13).
27 60 F.R.D. at 401.
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DR 9-101(B) to disqualify Reycraft can be found in the rationale
behind the promulgation of present Canon 4 28 and DR 4-101(B), 29
which require the preservation of confidences and secrets of a client.
One significant reason for their existence is to prevent breaches of
the relationship of trust established between attorney and client in
order to promote total disclosure of relevant facts to the attorney.
Such breaches are likely in situations involving a client's retention of
an attorney who has formerly counselled the adverse party.'" Pres-
ent Canon 4's relevance to this note is reflected by the fact that, in
promulgating DR 9-101(8), the ABA broadened the public employ-
ment doctrine beyond the proscriptions of Canon 4. 31 Therefore, in
order to have a meaningful existence, DR 9-101(B) must con-
template other breaches of the public trust. An analysis of the
ethical restrictions placed on government attorneys by Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics may provide some assistance in
determining those breaches which present Canon 9 and DR 9-101(B)
were' intended to encompass.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility replaced and
superseded the Canons of Professional Ethics, 32 both present Canon
9 and DR 9-101(B) carry forward the ethical precepts of former
Canon 36, 33 the prior statement of the public employment doctrine.
28 ABA Code, Canon 4 provides: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client."
29 ABA Code, DR 4-101(B) provides:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a conficlince or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client,
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
38 501 F.2d at 650 n.20.
31 It is worthy of note that the ABA Code was promulgated as a response to the need for
a concise set of ethical standards. The ABA Canons lacked the precision, clarity and order
essential to a proper enunciation of legal ethics. "By contrast the disciplinary rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are intended to constitute a complete set of standards for
disciplinary action." Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity: An Introduction, 48 Texas L. Rev. 255, 263 (1970). See generally Report of the Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, ABA Ann. Rep. 729, Preface (1965);
Armstrong, The Proposed New Code of Professional Responsibility, 41 N.Y.S.B.J. 591
(1969).
32 The original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in 1908. The Code of
Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on August 12, 1969 to become effective for American Bar Association members on
Jan. 1, 1970.
After substantial study and a number of meetim0, we concluded that the
present Canons needed revision in four principal particulars: (1) There are important
areas involving the conduct of lawyers that are either only partially covered in or
totally omitted from the Canons; (2) Many Canons that are sound in substance are in
need of editorial revision; (3) Most of the Canons do not lend themselves to practical
sanctions for violations; and (4) Changed and changing conditions in our legal system
and urbanized society require new statements of professional principles.
Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, ABA Ann. Rep. 729,
Preface (1969).
33 See note 24 supra.
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The restrictions imposed by former Canon 36 were intended to
prevent the possible charge "that the public employee's action .. .
might otherwise be influenced or be thought to have been influenced
by the hope of later being employed privately to uphold or to upset
what he had done . ,"34
 Canon 36 did not require the existence of
a conflict of interest as a condition precedent to its application, since
public confidence in government attorneys may deteriorate despite
the absence of conflict. In Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc. v. Ex-
change National Bank, 35
 plaintiffs attorney, while an employee of
the United States Attorney's Office, had participated in an investiga-
tion of a mortgage transaction which became the subject of the
private dispute. No conflict of interest was involved since in both
cases the attorney attempted to prove that the mortgage transaction
was fraudulent. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit, in affirming the
disqualification of plaintiff's attorney, concluded that "[t]he purpose
of [Canon 36] appears to be to prohibit an attorney from gaining
financial advantage through the use of information which he ob-
tained as a public official."36
The problem envisioned in Allied Realty was the possibility
that government attorneys, while exercising public power, might be
influenced by the potential for future private gain when determining
the desirability of investigating a particular matter. 37 Former Canon
36, as interpreted in Allied Realty, was intended to avoid such a
possibility, and was logically interpreted as proscribing both consis-
tent and inconsistent positions involving subsequent employment,
since financial attractions could arise in either case. Under that
analysis, it would seem that DR 9-101(B), the Disciplinary Rule
relevant to General Motors, requires a similar interpretation because
the possibility of lucrative financial gain, without more, raises the
appearance of evil."
On the facts of General Motors, it appears that the Second
Circuit properly concluded that Reycraft's employment by the City
was private within the meaning of D$. 9-101(B), despite the fact
that Reycraft was actually subsequently retained by a public entity.
His assistance in General Motors, though devoid of conflicts or
breach of confidence infirmities, remains susceptible to the equally
damning allegation that his intention to profit substantially arose
34 H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 131 (1953) (emphasis added). Contra, ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Opinions, No. 937 (1966). See also Hilo Metals Co. v. Learner
Co., 258 F. Supp. 23, 28-29 (D. Hawaii 1966); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions,
No. 49 (1931); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 37 (1931).
3S
 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969).
36
 Id. at 1102.
37
 See Allied Realty v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 469 (D. Minn. 1968).
38
 In a recent case in the Second Circuit, Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals. — F.2d
— (Civil No. 74-1757) (2d Cir., decided Jan. 30, 1975), the court interpreted the reason for
Reycraft's disqualification as fulfilling the need to enforce the duty of confidentiality. Id. at
1548. That principle is not at issue under these facts.
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during his former employment in the public domain. 39 Adoption of
the district court's narrower view that private employment does not
encompass the case where the attorney has maintained consistent
positions would create an immunity from the precepts of present
Canon 9 whenever an attorney is subsequently retained by a public
entity in a nonconflict of interest posture, regardless of the nature of
the fee accompanying his employment.
However, the mere fact that a former government attorney
subsequently joins a private firm, and thereupon undertakes to
represent a public entity in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while a public servant, may not, of itself, be sufficient
to warrant his disqualification under DR 9-101(B). The phrase "pri-
vate employment" should be interpreted in the light of the evil it is
apparently intended to prevent; namely, that government attorneys
might concentrate only on potentially lucrative cases, with a view
toward subsequent private gain. 40 Had Reycraft been paid at the
same hourly rate as that received by full-time attorneys in the City's
Office of Corporation Counsel, rather than on a contingent fee basis,
any inference that his motives while a public employee were com-
promised would be removed. In effect, he would be receiving no
greater remuneration for his participation in General Motors as a
result of his position in the private sector than he would have
received as a full-time employee of the City.
It is submitted that a member of a private firm who receives
compensation at the public attorney's level or lower should be
permitted to represent the public interest in such situations. An
overly broad interpretation of private employment in DR 9-101(B)
would preclude an attorney's use of his expertise even though the
appearance of impropriety could not fairly be said to arise by way of
his compensatory arrangement.
An additional condition precedent to the disqualification of an
attorney in a pending case is that both past and pending cases must
comprise the same matter under DR 9-101(B). The trial court and
the appellate court agreed on the proper test for determining this
issue as related to the 1956 Bus and General Motors cases.'" Yet, in
the application of that test, divergent results emerged. The crucial
39 The Second Circuit reasoned that:
There lurks great potential for lucrative returns in following into private practice the
course already charted with the aid of governmental resources. And, with such a
large contingent fee at stake, we could hardly accept 'pro bono publico' as a proper
characterization of Reycraft's work, simply because the keeper of the purse is the
City of New York or other governmental entities in the class.
501 F.2d at 650.
4° Id.
I "In determining whether this case involves the same matter as the 1956 Bus case, the
most important consideration is not whether the two actions rely for their foundation upon the
same section of the law, but whether the facts necessary to support the two claims are
similar." Id. at 651 n.22, quoting City of New York v. General Motors, 60 F.R.D. 393, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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factor responsible for the discrepancy in result was the weight
accorded the time lag between the respective suits, measured by the
relevancy to General Motors of the information obtained in 1956
Bus. In holding that the two cases did not constitute the same
matter, 42
 the district court noted that the applicable statute of
limitations" extended four years from the date of the accrual of the
cause of action. The court reasoned that "it is clear that only recent
violations of the law will be sufficient to sustain [the City's] cause of
action."" It is true that without evidence of attempted monopoliza-
tion amassed within the period of the statute of limitations, the
City's case would fail. Specific intent to exclude competition or build
monopoly is essential to a finding of an attempt to monopolize under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.'" Presumably, a violation might have
been established if such intent was based solely upon recent evi-
dence. However, a comparison of the complaints issued in 1956 Bus
and General Motors leaves the unremitting impression that much of
the matter alleged in the General Motors complaint was lifted ver-
batim from the 1956 Bus complaint. 46 The fact is that Reycraft did
appear to make use of the information he obtained in 1956 Bus. To
delve into the relative weight to be accorded the knowledge gained
in 1956 Bus for purposes of establishing a basis for disqualifying the
attorney in the instant case would be an overly technical exercise.
Public confidence in government attorneys would surely suffer if
allegations could be stricken from a complaint to fulfill an ethical
obligation retroactively. It is submitted that whenever allegations
are set forth in a complaint, an estoppel should arise against the
argument that they are neither essential, necessary, nor desirable.
As noted previously, there was a ten year interval between
Reycraft's departure from the Antitrust Division, resulting in his
relinquishment of responsibility in 1956 Bus, and the filing of the
General Motors complaint. The passage of time, though necessarily
a factor to be accounted for in considering the relevancy of informa-
tion previously obtained,'" has not, of itself, been construed as an
absolute bar to a finding that the same matter exists. Rather, it must
be viewed in the light of variations in the subject matter" or other
considerations of policy. 49
42 501 F.2d at 651.
43
 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
" 60 F.R.D. at 402.
85
 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
44 501 F.2d at 652-55 (Appendix).
47 Id. at 650 n.21.
48 See Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(laspe of 12 years does not permit counsel to continue in the case where the principle of
confidentiality is at stake); Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 145, 147 (D. Minn. 1970) (the computer industry had changed so completely in 15 years
that disqualification would not be warranted); Gillett v. Gillett, 269 Mich. 364, 368, 257
N.W. 719, 720 (1934) (11 years had passed, .the two suits bore no relationship whatsoever to
one another).
48 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 37 (1931) (representation denied
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The Second Circuit, in alluding to the similarities, rather than
the differences in the facts involved in the two cases, 5 ° properly
emphasized that, in ethical matters, the public interest requires the
eradication of all inferences of impropriety." The legal profession
suffers a loss of prestige whenever it appears to the public that
attorneys may be skirting their self-promulgated ethical regulations
by interposing overly technical distinctions in matters which might
reasonably appear to involve the same or similar facts.
If the only issue in General Motors was the actual impact of
Reycraft's former employment by the federal government upon the
outcome of that particular litigation, a different result might have
been reached. However, the Second Circuit recognized that the
courts' duty relative to questions of an ethical nature extends to
promotion of the "public's trust in the integrity of the Bar."52
Though at times the application of a disqualifying rule will cause
harsh results, 53 "[t]he stature of the profession and the courts, and
the esteem in which they are held, are dependent upon the complete
absence of even a semblance of improper conduct." 54
It is submitted that, on these facts, the Second Circuit properly
held that General Motors and 1956 Bus comprised the same matter
under DR 9-101(B). In General Motors, the "appearance of impro-
priety" arose because the evidence indicated that a sufficient nexus
of similarities existed between that case and 1956 Bus to indicate thê
presence of a repeated factual pattern. Certainly, where a substan-
tial number of allegations are transferred from one complaint to
another, the inference is strong that the same matter is involved.
Even in situations where the similarities are less apparent, it is
unlikely that the tests' applied by the district court and the court of
appeals can be improved. The approach must be essentially ad hoc,
but, in close cases, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the
where the attorney had been employed ten years previously as an assistant chief title
examiner, and had issued an administrative decision on the same matter for which his
subsequent representation was sought).
5° In referring to a second cause of action brought by the City, the Second Circuit stated:
The addition of the Clayton Act claim, based solely on the same 1925 Yellow Coach
acquisition which was part of the Sherman Act violation alleged by both the United
States and the City, hardly alters the nuclear identity of these two suits. Both, after
all, allege monopolization or attempted monopolization of the same product line—
city buses—and, in the same geographical market—the United States.
501 F.2d at 651.
51 Id. "Nowhere is Shakespeare's observation that 'there is nothing either good or bad,
but thinking makes it so,' more apt than in the realm of ethical considerations." Id., quoting
Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2 .d Cir. 1973).
52 501 F.2d at 649, quoting Ernie Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.Zd 562, 564-65
(2d Cir. 1973).
55 See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Cir. Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920,
926 (2d Cir, 1954) (attorney disqualified even though his prior representation of motion picture
corporations in antitrust actions came close to precluding him from serving as a plaintiff's
attorney in the entire field in which he had specialized during most of his professional life).
54 Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.Zd 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
55 See note 37 supra.
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matters involved are the same. Otherwise, the technicalities of proof
may offer the opportunity for minute distinctions leading to the
denial of a motion to disqualify, despite the continued existence of
the appearance of impropriety.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Second Circuit's
interpretation of DR 9-101(B) in General Motors is its practical
effect upon the future desirability of public service for attorneys.
Emphasis on the appearance of evil doctrine rather than on the fact
of propriety, evident in the Second Circuit's finding that General
Motors and 1956 Bus consist of the same matter under DR 9-101(8),
might lead the current or prospective government attorney to fear
that ethical infringements shall be imputed to him despite his efforts
to avert them." In order to obtain a proper perspective on the effect
of the General Motors decision, it should be read in conjunction
with United States v. Standard Oil Co. S 7 (Esso Export), the leading
case involving a former government attorney and the appearance of
evil doctrine.
In Esso Export, a civil suit to recover refunds from Standard
Oil for alleged overcharges in Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion (ECA) financed transactions, the United States moved for the
disqualification of a law firm, a partner of which had previously
been a government attorney for the Paris Office of the Special
Representative (OSR) of the ECA during the period of the alleged
infraction." Evidence was introduced to show that a specific divi-
sion of duty existed between ECA/Washington and OSR/Paris, and
that the Washington General Counsel's Office had exclusive respon-
sibility for the drafting, promulgation and enforcement of the pro-
curement and price provisions of the ECA regulations. Seizing upon
this division of authority, the court stated that "it is hardly reason-
16 "Unless courts delineate the various policy considerations motivating their decisions,
precedents offer little guidance to attorneys seeking to fulfill their ethical obligations." Note,
64 Yale L. J. 917, 928 (1955).
57 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Judge Kaufman, who wrote the Esso Export
opinion, recognized the ethical problems inherent in employment in the public domain when
he stated:
The appearance-of-evil doctrine is based on the desire to maintain a high regard
for the legal profession in the public mind. This policy, 1 believe, will also be better
served by not transferring the inferences applied to the private attorney to the
government attorney. First, if the Government's efforts to recruit able lawyers are
hindered by restrictive interpretations given to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it
will reflect adversely on the entire bar and its public-service traditions. Second,
when an attorney has acquired a knowledge of government procedure and an
understanding of the Government's viewpoint through employment with it, he will
be of greater value to future private clients. This should be encouraged rather than
discouraged. Third, since most attorneys in certain specialized technical areas of the
law gained their initial experience with some government agency, an unrealistic
application of the various disqualifying inferences might sterilize so many lawyers in
those fields that it would be difficult for a litigant to obtain proper counsel.
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney And The Canons Of Professional Ethics, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 657, 668 (1957).
5e
	
F. Supp. at 348.
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able to hold that an appearance of evil can be found . . . where
there is not some closer factual relationship between his former job
and the case at hand other than that the same vast agency is in-
volved."59
In effect, the government had failed to prove that its former
employee had actually worked with materials "substantially related"
to the Esso Export controversy, since any reference to the issues
raised in that case would have been inconsistent with the division of
functions existing within the ECA at that time. 66 Such issues had
never been surveyed by the former government attorney, despite the
fact that jurisdiction over the enforcement of the regillations was
under the aegis of his former employer, the ECA, during the period
of his employment.
General Motors leaves the division of authority concept intact.
Where a recognizable separation of duties is shown, the fact that
one government attorney may have had access to files in a matter in
which he took no actual part, or, by the nature of his position,
should have taken no part, will not cause his disqualification. In
that case, no inference of the appearance of impropriety will be
raised. 6 ' In fact, a case for disqualification under General Motors
and DR 9-101(B) will actually require a greater showing of personal
involvement than did Esso Export and former Canon 36.
Under DR 9-101(B), the attorney in Esso Export would have
had a clearer basis for continued involvement in that matter. DR
9-101(B), unlike former Canon 36, 62 requires that a government
attorney must have substantial responsibility in a matter before the
appearance of impropriety will arise with respect to any future
representation." This language should curtail the possibility of dis-
qualification by inference in government offices at the trial staff
level. An attorney in a specific trial section coincidentally working in
the same office in which a case arose, but who took no part in the
actual handling of the case, will not be disqualified from subsequent
employment involving the same matter, because he clearly lacked
substantial responsibility under DR 9-101(B). In addition, if any
meaning is to be given to the word "substantial," even an attorney
who was actually involved in a specific case should not necessarily
be disqualified. The question then becomes one of degree: how
much responsibility must a trial attorney possess before he will be
barred from future litigation involving the same matter?
Perhaps it could be stated as a general rule, that an attorney on
the trial staff level who signs a complaint should be irrebuttably
$ 9 Id. at 364.
" Id. at 357.
61
 501 F.2d at 652.
62
 Compare ABA Code, DK 9-101(B), note 10 supra, with ABA Canons, No. 36, note 24
supra.
63
 Perhaps the addition of this language is the "clarifying amendment" advocated by
Judge Kaufman in his article. Kaufman, supra note 57, at 669.
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presumed to have substantial responsibility for the matter contained
therein. The appearance of impropriety is too strong in this situation
to permit a showing that such responsibility did not, in fact, exist.
With respect to all other trial attorneys in a particular office, the
disqualifying inference should not arise without additional substan-
tiation of the nature of their involvement. An attorney who might
merely research a particular legal point, or offer advice on legal
issues, would lack a necessary quantum of discretion or authority to
have substantial responsibility for the case.
It is submitted that Reycraft was properly disqualified in Gen-
eral Motors. Analysis of the relevant ethical doctrines, old and new,
embodied in case law, ethics texts and bar association opinion letters
indicates that a government attorney's use of his public power has
always been closely scrutinized." In keeping with that tradition, a
finding that Reycraft's subsequent employment was private in na-
ture was required because his participation in 1956 Bus may have
been predominantly motivated by a personal desire to profit sub-
stantially at a later date from the specific factual information he
obtained therein. Moreover, in keeping with the exhortation of
present Canon 9 to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and upon
comparison between the 1956 Bus and General Motors complaints,
it appears that a sufficient number of similar factual allegations exist
in the two cases under examination to conclude that, for purposes of
DR 9-101(B), Reycraft's participation in General Motors afforded
him the opportunity to pass upon the same matter that he had
investigated in 1956 Bus. However, it is submitted, as a suggestion
for the proper circumscription of the appearance of evil doctrine,
that where a former government attorney is subsequently employed
by a public entity on a remunerative basis which brings him no
greater pay than he would receive if he were solely under the
employ of that public entity, such an arrangement should not be
construed as private employment under DR 9-101(B). Finally,
where the meaning of substantial responsibility under DR 9-101(B)
is at issue in the future, a suggested interpretation is that it should
encompass only those government attorneys who either sign a com-
plaint or possess sufficient discretion to determine the course of a
suit.
A government attorney need not fear that his subsequent pri-
vate career will be shattered by inferences raised from issues and
cases in which he did not participate. General Motors does not
horizontally impute knowledge across the breadth of a government
agency, 65
 nor even within a specific office of such agency. Rather,
the General Motors decision establishes a rule that a former gov-
64 Twenty years after the enactment of the original canons in 1908, Canon 36 of the ABA
Canons was adopted to deal specifically with the ethical problems encountered by government
attorneys. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
65 For further discussion regarding the application of the doctrine of imputed knowledge
to government attorneys, see 136 F. Supp. at 360-63; Kaufman, supra note 57.
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ernment attorney who is delegated substantial responsibility for a
particular case may be subject to disqualification in a pending case,
if a reasonable number of connecting factors exist between the cases,
and the financial attractions in the pending case are sufficiently
lucrative, to raise the appearance of impropriety. 66
ROBERT LLOYD RASKOPF
Environmental Law—Definition of Major Federal Action Under
the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) As Applied to Proj-
ects Partially Completed At the Date of NEPA's Enactment
—Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz. 1 —For twenty
years prior to passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 2 the Department of Agriculture and its subordinate agency,
the United States Forest Service, had entered into numerous sales
contracts with private lumbering concerns whereby the private
companies were permitted to cut an extensive amount of timber 3 in
part of a Wilderness Area4 known as the Boundaries Waters Canoe
Area (BWCA). 5 Subsequent to January 1, 1970, the date NEPA
became effective, the Forest Service continued to play an active role
in eleven of the pre-NEPA timber sales, although it did not award
any new contracts for this area. For example, the Forest Service
granted extensions of the land area to be cut under certain timbering
contracts and engaged in some administration of logging operations,
as by mapping out logging roads. The Forest Service did not file a
separate environmental impact statement (EIS) with regard to these
lumbering activities because it intended to include an analysis of
66
 The dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney's role in that process is
far too critical, and the public's interest in the outcome is far too great to leave room
for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer's representa-
tion in a given case.
Motor Mart v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as IIIPIRG].
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), The National Environmental Policy Act was signed into
law on New Years Day, 1970. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat, 852 (1970).
3
 "In recent years about 45,000 cords of timber on about 3,000 acres of land has been cut
in the Portal Zone area where timbering is permitted] each year." Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 594 (D. Minn, 1973).
A Wilderness Area is defined in the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970), as
follows:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor whu does
not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an area
of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so
as to perserve its natural conditions . . .
5
 The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to manage the MCA. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(d){5) (1970).
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